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Abstract—Generative adversarial network (GAN) has attracted
increasing attention recently owing to its impressive ability to
generate realistic samples with high privacy protection. Without
directly interactive with training examples, the generative model
can be fully used to estimate the underlying distribution of
an original dataset while the discriminative model can examine
the quality of the generated samples by comparing the label
values with the training examples. However, when GANs are
applied on sensitive or private training examples, such as medical
or financial records, it is still probable to divulge individuals’
sensitive and private information. To mitigate this information
leakage and construct a private GAN, in this work we propose
a Re´nyi-differentially private-GAN (RDP-GAN), which achieves
differential privacy (DP) in a GAN by carefully adding random
noises on the value of the loss function during training. Moreover,
we derive the analytical results of the total privacy loss under
the subsampling method and cumulated iterations, which show
its effectiveness on the privacy budget allocation. In addition, in
order to mitigate the negative impact brought by the injecting
noise, we enhance the proposed algorithm by adding an adaptive
noise tuning step, which will change the volume of added noise ac-
cording to the testing accuracy. Through extensive experimental
results, we verify that the proposed algorithm can achieve a better
privacy level while producing high-quality samples compared
with a benchmark DP-GAN scheme based on noise perturbation
on training gradients.
Index Terms—Generative Adversarial Network, Re´nyi-
Differential Privacy, Adaptive Noise Tuning Algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent technological advancements are transforming the
ways in which data are created and processed. With the advent
of the Internet-of-things (IoT), the number of intelligent de-
vices in the world is rapidly growing in the last couple of years.
Many of these devices are equipped with various sensors and
increasingly powerful hardware, which allow them to not just
collect, but more importantly, process data at unprecedented
scales. In the concurrent development, artificial intelligence
(AI) has revolutionized the ways that information is utilized
with ground breaking successes in areas such as computer
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vision, natural language processing, voice recognition, etc [1].
Therefore, there is a high demand for harnessing the rich data
provided by distributed devices to improve machine learning
models.
In the past few years, deep learning has demonstrated
largely improved performance over traditional machine learn-
ing methods in various applications, e.g., image understanding
[2], speech recognition [3], cancer analysis [4], and the game
of GO [5]. The great success of deep learning is owing to
the development of powerful computing processor and the
availability of massive data for training the neural networks.
However, there exists domains where the accessibility of this
huge data is not fully granted. For example, the sensitive
medical data are usually not open-access in most countries.
Thus, building a high-quality analytical model remains to
be challenging at present. At the same time, data privacy
has become a growing concern for clients. In particular, the
emergence of centralized searchable data repositories has made
the leakage of private information an urgent social problem,
e.g., health conditions, travel information, and financial data.
Furthermore, the diverse set of open data applications, such
as census data dissemination and social networks, place more
emphasis on privacy concerns. In such practices, the access
to real-life datasets may cause information leakage even in
pure research activities. Consequently, privacy preservation has
become a critical issue.
Fortunately, generative models [6] provide us with a promis-
ing solution to alleviated the data scarcity issue. By sketching
the data distribution from a small set of training data, it is fea-
sible to sample from the input distribution and further generate
more synthetic samples. By combining the complexity of deep
neural networks and game theory, the Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs) [7] and its variants have demonstrated
impressive performance on modelling the underlying data
distribution, generating high quality “fake” samples that are
hard to be distinguished from real ones, i.e., synthetic samples.
In this way, the availability of GANs can fully facilitate the
generated data and well protect the privacy of individuals.
However, the GANs can still implicitly disclose private
information on the training examples. The adversarial training
procedure and the high model complexity of deep neural
networks, jointly encourage a distribution that is concentrated
around training samples. By repeated sampling from the
distribution, there is a considerable chance of recovering the
training examples. For example, the authors in [8] introduced
an active inference attack model that can reconstruct training
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2samples from sampling generated data. Therefore, it is highly
demanded to have generative models that not only generates
high quality samples but also protects the privacy of the
training data. Indeed, a private GAN has its potential to address
this challenging problem.
To preserve the data privacy, one way is to make the
synthetic data differentially private with respect to the original
data. To do this, the authors in [9] modified the training
procedure of the discriminator to be differentially private by
using the Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE)
framework. The post-processing theorem then guarantees that
the generator of GAN will also be differentially private. Unlike
[9], the work in [10] introduced a subsampled randomized
algorithm that first takes a subsample for the dataset generated
through a subsampling procedure, and then applies a known
randomized mechanism M on the subsampled data points.
It is important to exploit the randomness in subsampling
because if the original mechanism is differentially private, then
the subsampled mechanism also obeys differentially privacy,
referred to the “privacy amplification lemma”. To further
conduct the sampling rate, [11], [12] introduced a key idea
that adding random noise to the updating gradients of the
discriminator during training, and provided privacy guarantees.
Moreover, norm clipping is used to bound the parameters
while it will also control the maximum influence of added
noises. However, bounding on the added noise will always
violate the privacy level, as its maximum scale of noise is
limited to one in their assumptions. To keep track of privacy
loss, differential privacy (DP) that measures the difference in
output between two input databases differing by at most one
element, has been evolved in [13]. By ensuring each gradient
descent step is differentially private, the final output model
satisfies a certain level of DP given by the strong composition
property. Moreover, to obtain a tighter estimation, Abadi et al.
[14] proposed the moment accountant methods, which track
the log moments of the privacy loss variable under random
sampling.
Nevertheless, the training of GAN usually suffers from its
instability, and directly adding random noises on the updating
gradients will definitely harm the learning performance. There-
fore, there needs a more subtle design on the privacy protection
scheme. In addition, the architecture of GAN evolves multiple
iterations. In more details, the fashion Wasserstein GAN [15]
will train the generator multiple times and train the discrimina-
tor once to obtain better results. Thus, to conduct the privacy
analysis, it is necessary to give an accurate estimation on each
iteration. To sum up, there are three key tasks to solve in the
design of a private GAN:
• Design a differentially private algorithm for GAN while
guaranteeing its performance.
• Obtain a tight privacy loss estimation under subsampling.
• Obtain an accurate privacy budget calculation for cumu-
lated iterations.
Accordingly, in this work, we propose a differentially
private GAN. To accurately estimate the privacy loss of the
proposed algorithm, we elaborate on the definition of Re´nyi-
DP which can achieve a tighter privacy analysis compared
to the moment accountant method. Furthermore, we improve
the proposed algorithm by designing an adaptive noise tuning
algorithm, which can achieve better learning performance.
Specifically, the contributions of this work are listed as fol-
lows:
• To achieve a differentially private GAN, we propose a
method, where random noises are added on the value
of the loss function of a discriminator in each iteration.
Different from previous works in [11], [12], the proposed
algorithm does not need an additional norm clipping
method as the chosen loss function can be bounded
naturally.
• To investigate the privacy loss of the proposed algorithm,
we first elaborate on the effectiveness of Re´nyi-DP in the
subsampling step, which is proved to achieve a tighter
analysis compared with the moment accountant method.
Then we obtain the expression of the total privacy cost
for cumulated iterations.
• To obtain better learning performances, we further im-
prove the proposed algorithm by adding an adaptive
noise tuning step, called the RDP-ANT algorithm. The
improved algorithm can adaptively change the value
of added noise according to the testing accuracy, and
eventually consummate the algorithm.
• We conduct sufficient numerical experiments to verify
the effectiveness of the analytical results. Compared with
other algorithms, the proposed algorithm will inject less
noise and obtain better performance in turn when achiev-
ing the same privacy level. Moreover, we also show the
superiority of the RDP-ANT algorithm compared with
other noise decay methods.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We introduce
the back ground in Section II, and propose the RDP-GAN
algorithm with comprehensive privacy loss analysis in Section
III. In Section IV, we show the details of the improved
adaptive noise tuning algorithm. Then, we validate the privacy
analysis through extensive simulations and discuss the network
performance in Section V, and conclude the paper in Section
VI.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we present some background knowledge of
DP and GAN.
A. (, δ)-Differential Privacy
We first recall the standard definition of (, δ)-DP [16].
Definition 1. (, δ-DP). A randomized mechanism f : X 7→ R
offers (, δ)-DP if for any adjacent X,X ′ ∈ X and S ⊂ R,
Pr [f (X) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr [f (X ′) ∈ S] + δ, (1)
where f(X) denotes a random function of X .
The above definition is contingent on the notion of adjacent
inputs X and X ′, which is domain-specific and is typically
chosen to capture the contribution to the mechanism’s input by
a single individual. Moreover, to avoid the worst-case scenario
of always violating privacy of a δ fraction of the dataset, the
3standard recommendation is to choose δ  1/N or even δ =
negl(1/N), where N is the data size.
The definition of (, δ)-DP is initially proposed to capture
privacy guarantees of the Gaussian mechanism, defined as
follows:
Gσf(X)
∆
= f(X) +N (0, σ2), (2)
where N (0, σ2) represents a random noise, which follows
the Gaussian normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
derivation σ. Elementary analysis shows that the Gaussian
mechanism satisfies a continuum of incomparable (, δ)-
differential privacy [16], for all combinations of  < 1 and
σ > ∆2f
√
2 ln 1.25/δ/, where the l2-sensitivity of f is
defined as
∆2f
∆
= max
X,X′∈X
‖f(X)−f(X ′)‖2, (3)
and taken over all adjacent inputs X and X ′.
We also list the proposition that will be used in the proof.
Proposition 1. (Post-processing.) Let M be an (, δ)-
differentially private algorithm and let F : O → O′ where
O′ is any arbitrary space. Then F ◦M is (, δ)-differentially
private.
B. -Re´nyi Differential Privacy
The original DP has been investigated in several works
to estimate the privacy level of a typical machine learning
algorithm, such as Deep Learning [14], Federated Learning
[17] and GAN [11], [12]. However, the original DP needs
strong assumption and will damage its accuracy when using
composition theorem, as pointed in [18]. Thus, we elaborate
a generalization of the notion of DP based on the concept of
the Re´nyi divergence, which can avert inaccuracy. The Re´nyi
divergence is classically defined as follows:
Definition 2. (Re´nyi divergence). For two probability distribu-
tions P and Q defined over R, the Re´nyi divergence of order
α > 1 is
Dα (P ||Q) ∆= 1
α− 1 logEx∼Q
(
P (x)
Q (x)
)α
, (4)
where P (x) denotes the density of P at x.
It motivates exploring a relaxation of DP based on the Re´nyi
divergence.
Definition 3. ((α, )-RDP). A randomized mechanism f :
X 7→ R is said to have -Re´nyi DP of order α, or (α, )-
RDP for short, if for any adjacent X,X ′ ∈ X it holds that
Dα (f (X) ||f (X ′)) ≤ . (5)
Remark 1. Similar to the definition of DP, a finite value for -
RDP implies that feasible outcomes of f(X) for some X ∈ X
are feasible, i.e., have a non-zero density, for all inputs from X
except for a set of measure 0. Assuming that this is in cause,
we let the event space be the support of the distribution.
We then list some propositions that will be used in deriving
the analytical results in the following.
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Fig. 1. The structure of GAN
Proposition 2. Let f : D 7→ R1 be (α, 1)-RDP and g :
R1 × D 7→ R2 be (α, 2)-RDP, then the mechanism defined
as (X,Y ), where X ∼ f(D) and Y ∼ g(X,D), satisfies
(α, 1 + 2)-RDP.
Proposition 3. (Probability preservation). Let α > 1, P and
Q be two distributions defined over R with identical support.
A ⊂ R be an arbitrary event. Then
P (A) ≤ {exp [Dα(P ||Q)] ·Q (A)}(α−1)/α. (6)
C. Generative Adversarial Networks
GAN is a recently developed generative model to produce
synthetic images or texts after being trained [7]. The learning
process in the model is based on one generator (g) and one
discriminator (d) neural networks playing in the following
zero-sum minimax (i.e., adversarial) game:
min
G
max
D
V (g, d) =
E[log(d(x)]x∼pdata(x) + E[log (1−d (g (z)))]z∼p(z),
(7)
where p(z) is a prior distribution of latent vector z, g(·) is a
generator function, and d(·) is a discriminator function whose
output spans [0, 1]. d(x) = 0 (resp. d(x) = 1) indicates that
the discriminator d classifies a sample x as generated (resp.
real).
In Fig. 1, we show a typical structure of GAN. g and d can
be any form of neural networks. The discriminator attempts
to maximize the objective, whereas the generator attempts
to maximize the objective. In other words, the discriminator
attempts to distinguish between real and generated samples,
while the generator attempts to generate real-looking fake
samples that the discriminator cannot distinguish from real
samples. According to the feedback in the interaction process,
the generator will updates its network to enhance the quality of
the generated samples. Adversaries exist in this environment
and may attack the interaction process, and obtain private
information from clients. In order to avoid this privacy leakage,
in the next section we propose a method to improve the privacy
performance of GAN.
4III. DESIGN OF RDP-GAN
In this section, we elaborate the design of RDP-GAN, a
Re´nyi differentially private adversarial network to mitigate
information leakage, and maintain desirable utility in the
generated data.
A. RDP-GAN Framework
In most real-world problems, the ture data distribution p(x)
is unknown and needs to be estimated empirically. Since
we are primarily interested in data synthesis, and we will
use GANs as the mechanism to estimate p(x) and draw
samples from it. If trained properly, a RDP-GAN will mitigate
inference attack during the data analysis.
The framework of RDP-GAN is structured as follows.
Sensitive data X is first fed into a discriminator with a privacy-
preserving layer. This discriminator is used to train a differ-
entially private generator to produce a private artificial dataset
X˜ . Different from the work on differentially private deep
learning (e.g., [11], [12], [14], [19]), the proposed algorithm
achieves DP by injecting random noise on the value of the
loss function in the interaction procedure. In more details, the
rational behind our design is as follows:
• Different from existing works, which add noise on the
gradients, the proposed algorithm focuses on the design
on the interaction between the generator and discrimi-
nator. This is because that from the aspect of an ad-
versary, the interaction process is more vulnerable to
attack than the network architecture if the generator
and discriminator are not assembled. Moreover, it is not
trivial to acknowledge information from the inside of the
discriminator or generator.
• Adding noise on the value of the loss function is a direct
method compared to the method in [11], [12], [19], which
will bring explicit privacy protection. This is because
that the loss values, not the parameters, are exchanged
between generator and discriminator, and the perturbation
on the loss value will directly influence the updates of
the generator. In addition, the privacy estimation is not
that accuracy as the changes of the privacy level from
parameters to loss values are ignored in the previous
works.
• Adding noise on the value of the loss function does not
need an extra norm clipping function as we naturally use
a bounded activation function as the last layer of neuron
network. Manually bounding the loss function is an non-
trivial task as its value is sensitive and needs adjustment
based on empirical results.
Despite the fact that the generator does not have access to
the real data X in the training process, one cannot guarantee
DP because of the information passed through with the loss
value from the discriminator. A simple high level example
will illustrate such breach of privacy. Let the dataset X , X ′
contain some small real numbers. The only difference between
these two datasets is the number x′ ∈ X ′, which happens to
be extremely large. Since the impact of x′ is large enough
to influence the performance of the discriminator, specifically
on its loss value, it will lead to a large difference whether
x is used to train or not. In this case, this difference on the
loss value will be propagated to the generator that will break
privacy.
B. The Implementation of RDP-GAN
Our method focuses on preserving the privacy during the
training procedure, and we add noise on the loss value of the
discriminator as follows:
E[log(d(x)] = Fd(W ;X)←
m∑
i=1
Fd(wi;xi)+N (0, σ2), (8)
where we use Fd(; ) to represent the value of the loss function
of all data samples, and m denotes the sample size of the
discriminator, respectively.
We first explain this perturbation on the loss value will
not vanish during back propagation. Considering a L layers
network, the perturbed loss value of the last layer (the L-th
layer) can be represented by
FLd = ∇AC A′(zL) +N (0, σ2), (9)
where A denotes the activation function of the L-th layer, C
denotes the correct label,  expresses the XNOR function that
outputs a logical one or true only if two inputs are the same,
and zL is the input of the L-th layer, respectively [20]. During
back propagation, this perturbation is involved as follows:
F ld = [(w
l+1)TF l+1d ]A′(zl), (10)
where l = L− 1, L− 2, ..., 2, 1. Thus, if adding noise on the
value of the discriminator can achieve DP, this perturbation
will be elaborated during the back propagation when updating
the discriminator, and ensures that the discriminator is DP.
Moreover, the loss value (parameters) of generator can also
guarantee DP because of post-processing property in [16]
which states that any mapping (operation) after a differentially
private output will not invade the privacy. Here the mapping
is in fact the computation of parameters of generator.
The RDP-GAN procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
C. Privacy Analysis of RDP-GAN
Because the proposed algorithm consists of multiple itera-
tions and in order to analyze the total privacy loss, we first
prove that adding noise on the value of the loss function in the
discriminator ensures the Re´nyi differential privacy, and then
show that the generator can satisfy DP.
1) Sensitivity on the loss function: According to the def-
inition of DP, we consider two adjacent database X and X ′
with same size, and only differ by one sample.
Consequently, for the discrimination in one iteration, the
training process can be written as:
Ld(X) = min
W
Fd(W ;X), (11)
where Ld(X) denotes the training process. Therefore, the
sensitivity on the loss function can be expressed as
∆S = max
X,X′∈X
||Fd(W ;X)− Fd(W ′;X ′)||. (12)
5Algorithm 1 Framework of the Proposed RDP-GAN.
Input: real samples: {x1, x2, · · · } ∼ p(x); prior samples:
{z1, z2, · · · } ∼ p(z); sampling rate: q; number of dis-
criminator iterations per generator iteration: nd; number
of generator iteration: ng; noise scale: σ;
Output: differential private generator.
1: Initialize discriminator parameters d0, generator parame-
ters g0.
2: For t1 = 1, ..., ng do
3: For t2 = 1, ..., nd do
4: Sample {x1, x2, · · ·xm} ∼ p(x) a batch of m real data
points.
5: Sample {z1, z2, · · · zm} ∼ p(z) a batch of m prior
samples.
6: Train the discriminator d.
7: For each data sample i, add a random noise on the value
of the loss function as Fd(W ;X)←
∑m
i=1 F
t2
d (wi;xi) +
N (0, σ2).
8: Update the discriminator d according to Eq. (9) and
(10).
9: End for
10: Update the generator g.
11: End for
12: Return differentially private generator g.
To make the loss function bounded, we can choose a
bounded activation as the last network layer, thus the value
Wi (Xi) of the i-th sample is bounded. So the value of the
loss function F (; ) has a bounded input with unchanged label,
and its output is naturally bounded according to the forward
processing property. In addition, we denote the bound of loss
function by C1. Thus, following the same logic of [17], the
sensitivity of loss function can be expressed as
∆S = C/|X|. (13)
From Eq. (13), we can observe that when the batch size
increases, the sensitivity should decrease accordingly. The
intuition is that the maximum difference on single data sample
can make is set to C and such a maximum difference is scaled
down by a factor of |X| since every data sample contributed
equally to the resulting model. For example, if a model is
trained by patient records with a certain disease, acquiring
that an individual’s record is among them directly affects the
privacy. If we increase the size of the dataset, it will be more
difficult to determine whether this record is part of the training
data or not.
2) Privacy analysis on the discriminator: With the sensi-
tivity, we can design the Gaussian mechanism N (0, σ2) with
(α, )-RDP requirement in terms of the sampling rate q under
nd iterations. In Theorem 1, we present the privacy level of
the output of discriminator as follows.
Theorem 1. Given the sampling rate q and the sensitivity ∆S,
adding random noise N (0, σ2) on the loss function, the output
1Note here C can be different for different datasets and loss functions. In
our experimental results, we will conduct experiments to obtain C empirically.
of discriminator for each iteration can satisfy (α, )-RDP, and
 ≤ qα2∆S22(α−1)σ2 .
Proof. Please find the proof in the Appendix A.
We then provide the following lemma, which will be used
to prove the output of discriminator after nd iterations can
satisfy (d, δ)-DP. For simplicity, we rewrite the loss function
Fd(W ;X) as Fd(X) in the following.
Lemma 1. Let f : D 7→ R be an adaptive composition of n
mechanisms all satisfying (α, )-RDP. Let X and X ′ be two
adjacent inputs. Then for any subset S ⊂ R:
Pr [Fd(X) ∈ S] ≤
exp
{
2
√
n log /Pr [Fd(X ′) ∈ S]
}
· Pr [Fd (X ′) ∈ S] .
(14)
Proof. Please find the proof in the Appendix B.
Remark 2. Compared with the standard composition theorem,
i.e., the Proposition 2, Lemma 1 can achieve a tighter privacy
estimation on multiple mechanisms.
Theorem 2. Given the number of discriminator iterations nd,
the sampling rate q and the sensitivity ∆S, adding random
noise N (0, σ2) on the value of the loss function of discrimi-
nator, the output guarantees (d, δ)-DP under a composition of
nd RDP mechanisms, when log (1/δ) ≥ 2nd. The expression
of d can be derived as
d
∆
= 4
√
2nd log (1/δ), (15)
where  = qα
2∆S2
2(α−1)σ2 .
Proof. Please find the proof in the Appendix C.
3) Privacy analysis of the generator: We next provide the
analytical privacy results on the generator according to the
post processing property.
Theorem 3. The output of generator in the proposed algo-
rithm guarantees (g, δ)-DP, where
g = 4
qα2∆S2
2(α− 1)σ2
√
2nd log (1/δ) (16)
Proof. The privacy mechanism guarantees a direct conse-
quence from followed Proposition 1 by the post processing
property of DP.
4) Privacy analysis of the total training process: Finally,
we come to our final results that the proposed algorithm after
ng iterations satisfies the DP guarantee.
Theorem 4. The proposed algorithm satisfies (total, δ)-DP,
where total = ngg, and ng denotes the total iterations of
generator in this algorithm.
Remark 3. For the calculation of the total privacy budget, it
cannot directly using the composition property (Lemma 1) as
there is a strict condition in Theorem 2, i.e., log (1/δ) ≥ 2nd.
For typical DP setting, we can choose δ = 10−5 and  = 1,
then we can obtain ng ≤ 11.5. Thus this condition cannot be
satisfied in GAN scenarios as we always set a large number
6of iterations, usually ng > 1000. So we directly sum all the
privacy budgets of every generator iteration in Theorem 4.
IV. ADAPTIVE NOISE TUNING ALGORITHM
Although the loss value is bounded naturally, adding ran-
dom noise may reduce the learning performance. In Algo-
rithm 1, the privacy budget allocated to one iteration is evenly
distributed, which implies a same noise scale of Gaussian
mechanism in every generator iteration. In general, the final
model performance, such as convergence, accuracy, etc., is
largely dependent on the amount of noise added over the
training process [19]. Thus, in order to obtain a better learning
performance, we can optimize the allocation of privacy budget
and design the amount of noise added in each iteration. The
details are described as follows.
A. Adaptive Noise Tuning Algorithm
Our adaptive noise tuning algorithm follows the idea that,
as the training continues, it is expected to have less noise
on the loss function, which allows the model converge faster
and obtain better results. Similar ideas have been applied by
adjusting the learning rate in common practice [21]. Therefore,
we propose an algorithm that can adaptively tune the noise
scale over the training iterations, and effectively improve the
model accuracy in turn.
Our approach for adaptive tuning the noise scale is to
monitor the training accuracy and reduce the noise scale when
the accuracy stops improving. To do this, we first add an extra
testing process after each generator finishes training in each
iteration. Every time when the improvement of the testing
accuracy is less than a predefined threshold τ , the noise scale
is reduced by a factor of k until the total privacy budget runs
out. Although this will lead to recalculating privacy cost, we
can show the improvement on the performance is convincing
despite more energy cost in the experimental results.
In our approach, with a validation dataset, the testing
accuracy is checked periodically during the training process
in the generator to determine whether the noise scale needs
to be reduced for subsequent iterations. Let σt be the noise
scale in the tth iteration obtained by Theorem 4 when the
total privacy budget and total iterations are given, and St
be the corresponding testing accuracy. The noise scale for
the subsequent iterations is adjusted based on the accuracy
difference between the current and previous iteration.
σt+1 =
{
σt, if St+1 − St ≥ τ ;
kσt, else,
(17)
where τ denotes the threshold for the testing accuracy.
Initially we set 0 < k ≤ 1 and S0 = 0. Then the updated
noise scale σt+1 will be applied to the next iteration.
In addition, we find that the testing accuracy may not
increase monotonically as the training progresses, and its
fluctuation may cause unnecessary reduction of noise scale
and thus wasting the privacy budget. This motivates us to use
the average of testing accuracy to improve the algorithm: at
the current testing iteration t, we define an average testing
accuracy St over the previous iterations as follows:
St =
1
t
t∑
i=1
Si. (18)
The average testing value will replace the previous one in
Eq.(17) and determine whether the noise scale should be
reduced or not.
To sum up, we formally present our adaptive noise tuning
DP-GAN framework in the Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Framework of the adaptive noise tuning RDP-
GAN.
Input: real samples: {x1, x2, · · · } ∼ p(x); prior samples:
{z1, z2, · · · } ∼ p(z); sampling rate: q; number of dis-
criminator iterations per generator iteration: nd; number of
generator iteration: ng; decay rate: k; total privacy budget:
total;
Output: differential private generator.
1: Initialize discriminator parameters d0, generator parame-
ters g0.
2: According to the total privacy budget total and the total
number of generator iterations ng , estimate the noise scale
for each generator iteration by Theorem 3 and Theorem 4.
The algorithm ends when total = 0.
3: According to the total number of discriminator iterations
nd, estimate the initial noise scale for each generator
iteration by Theorem 1.
4: For t1 = 1, ..., ng do
5: For t2 = 1, ..., nd do
6: Sample {x1, x2, · · · } ∼ p(x) a batch of m real data
points.
7: Sample {z1, z2, · · · } ∼ p(z) a batch of m prior samples.
8: Train the discriminator d.
9: For each data sample i, Fd(W ;X) ←∑m
i=1 F
t2
d (wi, xi) +N (0, σ2t ).
10: Update the discriminator d according to Eq. (9) and
(10).
11: End for
12: Update the generator g and generates fakes samples to
test.
13: According to the Eq. (17), update the noise scale σt1 to
σt1+1 and calculate the rest total.
14: Train the discriminator d.
15: End for
16: Return differentially private generator g.
B. Pre-defined Noise Decay Schedules
In this subsection, we will list several predefined noise de-
cay schedules, and provide comprehensive comparison results
with our proposed algorithm in Sec. 5.5.
1) Time-Based Decay: According to [22], it is defined with
the mathematical form
σt = σ0/ (1 + kt) , (19)
where σ0 is the initial noise scale, k is the decay rate and t is
the current iteration, respectively.
7TABLE I
SOME EXAMPLES OF THE ADULT DATASET
Age Occupation Education Gender Work Class Marital Status Work Hour Income
39 Sales Bachelors Male State-gov Never-married 30 ≤ 50K
38 Tech-support HS-grad Male Private Divorced 35 ≤ 50K
44 Prof-specialty Masters Male Private Married-civ-spouse 42 > 50K
43 Other-service Some-college Female State-gov Separated 26 ≤ 50K
2) Exponential Decay: It has the mathematical form that
σt = σ0 ∗ e−kt. (20)
3) Step Decay: Step decay reduces the learning rate by
some factor every few iterations. The mathematical form is
expressed as
σt = σ0 ∗ kt/t∗ , (21)
where t < t∗ decides how often to reduce noise in terms of
the number of iterations.
C. Privacy Preserving Parameter Selection
The proposed algorithms require a set of pre-defined hy-
perparameters, such as decay rate k. This value will defi-
nitely the training time and affect the final model accuracy.
Intuitively speaking, a smaller decay rate k will lead to a
better performance but longer training iterations. It is expected
to find an appropriate decay rate for the schedules under
an optimal tradeoff between the learning performance and
training. However, this decay rate should be determined by
multiple factors such as typical neuron network, training set
and other factors. Thus in this subsection, we only propose a
straightforward method to obtain an appropriate value. To list
k candidates by training k neural networks respectively and
directly choose the one that achieves the highest accuracy,
accordingly we show the experimental results in Sec. V-E.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of our
analytical results for different privacy budgets. Then, we
evaluate our proposed RDP-GAN method on the tabular and
image datasets, respectively. In addition, we demonstrate the
effectiveness of the improved algorithm with various noise
scaling methods and parameter settings.
A. Experimental Setting
1) Dataset: In our experiments, we use two benchmark
datasets for different tasks:
• Adult, which consists of 30K individual information, has
14 attributes (8 selected in the experiments) for each
individual and split into 20K training and 10K test
samples. We show an Adult dataset sample with some
attributes in Table I.
• MNIST, which consists of 70K handwritten digit images
of size 28 × 28, split into 60K training and 10K test
samples. We show the typical samples of the standard
MNIST dataset in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Some samples of the MNIST dataset
2) GAN: The neural network architecture is adapted to the
deep convolutional GAN (DCGAN), where the discriminator
is a convolutional neural network (CNN) that contains 3 layers.
In each layer, a list of learnable filters are applied to the entire
input matrix, where data samples are converted into square
matrices in our method. To make the loss value bounded,
we choose the Sigmoid activation function as the last layer
that generates the probability of being real or fake. The loss
function of the discriminator is set to use Cross Entropy
function. The generator is also a neural network that consists
of 3 de-convolutional layers.
In the experiment, we set the learning rate of discriminator
ad and generator ag to be 5.0 × 10−5. The sampling rate q
is set according to different batch sizes, and the number of
iterations on discriminator (nd) and generator (ng) are 5 and
103, respectively.
3) Privacy and Utility Level Estimation: In the experimen-
tal results, we set up two privacy levels: total = 0.5 and
total = 5, respectively. To verify the generated results, we use
an additional classifier to test the accuracy with right labels
in the MNIST dataset. The classifier is trained by the 10K
test samples in the MNIST dataset and is used to distinguish
whether an input digit with a predefined label is belong to
the right label. Moreover, the classifier uses a multilayer
perceptron (MLP) neural network with 3 layers. Except for
the input nodes, each node is a neuron that uses Sigmoid
activation function. In the Adult dataset, we conducted the
probability mass function (PMF) and the absolute average
error with the true data for each attribute. For the relationship
among different attributes, we use a trained classifier to test the
accuracy. In addition, the absolute average error is calculated
by the following equation:
Error =
|X|∑
x=1
|pg(x)− pr(x)| × x; (22)
where |X| denotes the total number of labels, pg(x) and pr(x)
denote the PMF of the generated and real data, respectively.
B. Analytical Results on the Privacy Level
1) Investigation on the Sensitivity: Before we show the
analytical results of the proposed RDP-GAN, we need to
investigate the sensitivity on the loss function. According to
Eq. (13), we can first estimate the bound of loss function and
8TABLE II
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE SENSITIVITY VALUE ON THE LOSS
FUNCTION.
Batch size = 64 Batch size = 128
Maximum value of loss function on Adult 17.852 21. 242
Maximum value of loss function on MNIST 23.534 26.823
C on Adult 20 23
C on MNIST 25 28
∆S on the Adult dataset 0.3125 0.1796
∆S on the MNIST dataset 0.1953 0.2187
calculate the sensitivity. We conduct experimental results on
the Adult and MNIST dataset, respectively, and record the
maximum loss value without injecting noises in In Table II.
From the results we can find a large batch size will lead
to a large maximum loss function value on both datasets.
Accordingly, we set C for different situations in Table. II2.
The results also indicate that one individual will produce less
influence in a larger dataset.
2) Analytical Results on the Privacy Level of Generator: To
show the effectiveness of the RDP-GAN, we compare it with
the method using Moment Accountant (MA) algorithm [12],
[14] as shown in the follow figures. In [12], [14], the privacy
level of generator g in each iteration can be expressed as
g =
2q
√
nd log
(
1
δ
)
σ
, (23)
where the sensitivity is omitted in the formula. In addition,
the expression of g in MA has a order of O( 1σ ), where our
analysis method (RDP) will achieve a order of O( 1σ2 ) respect
of the injected noise. This will lead to a higher privacy level
in RDP when the noise scale is qualitative larger, e.g., σ > 10.
In Fig. 3 we investigate the privacy level in two batch sizes.
As can be found in these figures, the proposed RDP method
can achieve a better privacy level when larger noises are added
as expected. Moreover, the privacy level in the Adult dataset
is always higher (a smaller ) than the MNIST dataset. The
intuition behind this is that the sensitivity in the Adult dataset
is lower than it in the MNIST dataset as it has less attributes.
C. Experimental Results on the MNIST Dataset
In this subsection, we excute the proposed algorithm on
the MNIST dataset. In Fig. 4, we first show the real and
generated data samples with different noise scale. We also
show the results generated by the DP-GAN [11], [12] for
comparison, which adds noise on the gradients. From the
figure we can find the generated digits with low privacy level
can well preserve the characters of the true ones, and with
the increase of the privacy level, the quality begins to drop
as there are unclear pixels exists. For example, we can find
the digit 2 and digit 8 are hard to recognize in the generated
samples when total = 5. Moreover, the quality generated by
DP-GAN is obviously worse than the proposed RDP in both
privacy levels.
2Note here the value of C is only used to estimate the privacy loss.
Nevertheless, we will show the proposed privacy analysis can achieve a lower
bound compared to other method under same noise.
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Fig. 3. The analysis privacy level with different noise scales.
Fig. 4. Generated MNIST samples with different noise scale: (a) RDP
(total = 0.5); (b) DP-GAN (total = 0.5); (c) RDP (total = 5); (d)
DP-GAN (total = 5).
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Fig. 5. The classification accuracy with different noise sacles in MNIST
dataset.
In order to further verify the qualities of the generated
samples, we use an additional classifier to test the accuracy.
We show the test accuracy along with the training process
(i.e., 1000 iterations) in the following figures. From Fig. 5
we can first find that the generated samples without privacy
protection, i.e., σ = 0, can achieve relative high accuracy in
the classifying. Second, with the increase of the noise scale,
the accuracy performance begins to fluctuate, which is brought
from the injected noises. In addition, a few collapse cases
happen when a large noise is added. For example, we can find
in Fig. 5(d) the accuracy always suddenly drops to 0.3 or less.
This is because the large scale of σ will probably brings about
huge noises to the loss function that the system cannot stand.
Therefore, it will lead to unacceptable results in the generated
samples, i.e., the digit 8 in Fig. 4 when σ = 20.
In addition, we compare our algorithm (RDP) with the
method that adds noise on the parameters, i.e., DP-GAN in
two privacy levels, total = 0.5 and total = 5, respectively.
As can be found in Fig. 6, the proposed algorithm has a better
performance compared with DP-GAN in both privacy levels,
in which the biggest performance gap is around 7% when
classifying digit 3 in the high privacy level. As explained in
Sec. 3.1, the superior performance of the proposed RDP-GAN
compared with the DP-GAN is because that adding noise on
the loss function can bring in more explicit privacy protection.
D. Experimental Results on the Adult Dataset
In this subsection, we show the performance of the proposed
algorithm on the Adult dataset. In Fig. 7 we show the
probability mass function (PMF) of the generated attributes.
Take the attribute of Age as an example, we use binning to
divide the age range into 9 regions as shown in Fig. 7(a) to
increase the training speed,. As can be found in Fig. 7(a),
the generated samples can achieve similar distribution with
the true ones, while the samples with larger noise make more
differences. Moveover, the largest difference is focused on the
edge domain. The main reason may because the generator
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Fig. 6. The classification accuracy comparison with DP-GAN.
TABLE III
ABSOLUTE AVERAGE ERROR FOR THE GENERATED SAMPLES WITH
DIFFERENT PRIVACY LEVELS.
Age Occ. Edu. Gen. Work C Mar. Work H Inc.
 =∞ 1.09 0.68 0.92 0.01 0.834 0.36 1.66 0.06
 = 5 1.1 1.23 1.23 0.009 1.11 0.57 1.65 0.17
 = 0.5 3. 1.75 1.87 0.048 2.21 0.69 2.55 0.44
always produces samples that are likely to appear in the
true dataset, i.e., the one close the average value. Similar
phenomenon can be found in other attributes as well. To
further investigate this the quality of the generated samples,
we show the absolute average error for these attributes. As
can be found in Table. III, when more noises are injected, the
absolute average error increases. Thus, the proposed algorithm
may not have the capability to achieve high performance in
maintaining the character of unique attributes, especially in the
tabular dataset. To further enhance this performance, it may
need more intelligent design on the generator, which is left as
our future work.
To verify the correlation among different attributes, we use
a trained classifier to determine whether the income of an
individual is larger than 50K or not. Experimental results on
the comparison of the proposed RDP-GAN with DP-GAN can
be found in Fig. 8. From Fig. 8(a) we can find the classifier
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Fig. 7. The PMF of generated synthetic samples.
is able to obtain a fairly high accuracy trained by the true
data samples, which has around 96.4% accuracy. Moreover,
compared with DP-GAN, the proposed RDP algorithm can
better capture the relationship among attributes in both privacy
level. For example, when  = 0.5, the performance gap is
around 4.1% (82.5 v.s. 78.4%). In addition, in Fig. 8(b) we
trained the classifier using the synthetic data, and test its
accuracy using the true data. The results also show that the
proposed algorithm can achieve a better performance than DP-
GAN at a same privacy level.
E. Experimental Results on the Adaptive Noise Tuning Algo-
rithm
In this subsection, we first conduct experiments to find the
appropriate decay rate for different algorithms. Specifically,
we choose total = 0.5 and 1000 iterations, which leads to
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Fig. 8. Correlation comparison with DP-GAN.
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Fig. 9. The accuracy with different decay rate k in the MNIST Dataset.
adding σ = 10 to the discriminator in each iteration, and the
testing accuracy τ is set to 0.5 to prevent model collapsing. In
addition, we denote the Time-based decay, Exponential decay
and Step decay as Time, Exp and Step, respectively, and the
t∗ in Step is set to 100. In the following, we show the trend
of the testing accuracy with different value of decay rate k in
the Adult dataset.
From Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, we can find there exists an optimal
decay rate in the current system setting. For example, in the
ANT-RDP algorithm, the best accuracy occurs when k = 0.8
in the Adult dataset, and k = 0.7 in the Adult dataset,
respectively. In addition, the performance of the Time, Step
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Fig. 10. The accuracy with different decay rate k in the MNIST Dataset.
TABLE IV
AVERAGE ACCURACY FOR DYNAMIC SCHEDULES IN THE MNIST
DATASET: RDP-GAN ( = 0.5); TIME (k = 0.05); STEP (k = 0.6); EXP
(k = 0.01); ANT-RDP (k = 0.8)
No Privacy RDP-GAN Time Step Exp ANT-RDP
Iterations 1000 1000 657 564 902 868
Accuracy 0.995 0.863 0.874 0.876 0.898 0.908
and ANT-RDP schedules seem to have a convex relationship
with the value of k. Intuitively speaking, it may because that
a lower decay rate causes to a longer training time, and it will
produce a worse accuracy because most iterations will suffer
from noise-added parameters. On the other side, a higher decay
rate leads to the noise scale decaying sharply in this case and
therefore resulting in an insufficient training time, which may
also degrades the accuracy. Moreover, we show a comparable
results for these algorithms in Table. IV and Table. V.
From the tables we can find that all the dynamic schedules
can achieve a better performance than RDP-GAN, with smaller
cost on the training iterations. The reason behind this is that
the dynamic algorithm will adjust the scale of the added
noise according to the testing performance, and it will cost
more privacy budget when noise scale becomes smaller in
each iteration, thus leading to less iterations. Moreover, the
proposed ANT-RDP can obtain the highest accuracy on both
datasets while it does not need the largest iterations. For
example, compared with the Exp algorithm, the ANT-RDP has
a better accuracy, i.e., there is a 0.4% performance gain in the
Adult dataset, and 0.9% in the MNIST dataset, respectively,
while needs less iterations, i.e., they are 49 and 34 less in each
dataset.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a brief literature review of
relevant topics: differential privacy and differentially private
deep learning.
TABLE V
AVERAGE ACCURACY FOR DYNAMIC SCHEDULES IN THE ADULT DATASET:
RDP-GAN ( = 0.5); TIME (k = 0.04); STEP (k = 0.5); EXP (k = 0.01);
ANT-RDP (k = 0.7)
No Privacy RDP-GAN Time Step Exp ANT-RDP
Iterations 1000 1000 632 532 894 845
Accuracy 0.964 0.825 0.836 0.828 0.839 0.843
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) [16] and related algorithms have
been widely studied in the literatures. The work [23] laid the
theoretical foundations of many DP studies by adding noise to
make the maximum change of data related functions. Another
related frameworks that adds noise on gradient are [24] and
its followed work [25], which studied to obtain information
from models with DP requirements using stochastic gradient.
In [26], a comprehensive and structured overview of DP
data publishing and analysis show several possible future
directions and applications. In addition, to tightly analyze the
composition, especially on the tails of the privacy loss, the
work [18] gave a new privacy definition, named Re´nyi DP.
The Re´nyi DP is not only a natural generalization of pure
DP as it shares many properties with DP, but also has the
capability to capture a more accurate aggregate privacy loss
by the composition theorem.
B. Differentially Private Deep Learning
Abdadi et al. [14] proposed a differentially private SGD al-
gorithm for deep learning to offer provable privacy guarantees
on the output model, and the work [19] used the concentrated
DP [13], which is in spirt of RDP, to provide cumulative
privacy loss estimation over computations. Moreover, the
applications of DP in GAN, such as [11], [12], have well
addressed information leakage by adding noises to gradients
during training. They also can produce data samples with good
quality under reasonable privacy budgets.
Different from these solutions, our work can obtain an more
accurate estimation of privacy loss. The properties of RDP
is first used to apply in the GAN. Moreover, we provide
a naturally succeed method without artificial clipping on
the noise-added gradients, which may destroy the learning
performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a Re´nyi-differentially private-
GAN (RDP-GAN), which achieves differential privacy (DP)
under the framework of GAN by carefully adding random
Gaussian noises on the value of the loss function during
training. The advantages of applying perturbation on the
loss function are three-fold: i) loss values are exchanged by
the generator and discriminator directly which need more
protection than parameters; ii) adding noise on the loss value
can provide explicit privacy protection; and iii) it does not
need value clipping on the parameters, so that the stability can
be enhanced. We theoretically obtained the analytical results
of the total privacy loss considering the subsampling method
and multiple iterations of training with equal privacy budget
allocation to each iteration. In addition, in order to alleviate the
negative impact brought by the noise injection, we improved
the proposed algorithm by designing an adaptive noise tuning
algorithm, which can adaptively change the value of added
noise according to the testing accuracy. Through compre-
hensive experimental results, we verified that the proposed
algorithm can achieve a higher data utility compared with the
existing DP-GAN algorithm at the same DP protection level.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let Fd denote the loss function of discriminator, X and
X ′ are adjacent datasets which only differ one element x′.
Thus, the loss value of these two adjacent datasets after noise
perturbation are expressed as:
Ld (W ;X) = Fd (W ;X) +N (0, σ2);
L′d (W
′;X ′) = F ′d (W
′;X ′) +N (0, σ2), (24)
where W denotes the parameter incurring in the neural net-
work.
From Eq. (24), we know Ld (W ;X) is a summation of
two independent random variables. Using the Gaussian ap-
proximation approach in [27], the summation of these two
RVs can be treated as another RV which also follows a
Gaussian distribution. Moreover, without loss of generality,
we assume that
∑
i∈|X|\[x′] Fd(xi) = 0. Thus Ld (W ;X)
and L′d (W
′;X ′) are distributed identically except for the first
coordinate and hence we have a one-dimensional problem
[14]. Let u0 denote the pdf of N (0, σ2) and let u1 denote
the pdf of N (∆S, σ2). Thus we have
L′ (W ′;X ′) ∼ v0 , u0;
L (W ;X) ∼ v1 , (1− q)µ0 + qu1,
(25)
where q is the sampling rate and ∆S denotes the sensitivity
bound on the loss function. In addition, q = mn , where m, n
denotes the sampling and total size of dataset, respectively.
According to the definition of Re´nyi differential privacy in
Eq. (5),  of one iteration can be expressed as
max
(
Dα
Ld(X)
Ld(X′)
, Dα
Ld(X′)
Ld(X)
)
. For simplicity, we rewrite the
Ld (W ;X) as Ld (X).
To obtain , we first calculate Dα
(
Ld(X)
Ld(X′)
)
as
Dα
(
Ld(X)
Ld(X ′)
)
=
1
α− 1 logEx∼Ld(X′)
(
Ld(X)
Ld(X ′)
)α
=
1
α− 1 log
∫
u0
[
(1− q)u0 + qu1
u0
]α
dx
=
1
α− 1 log
∫
u0
{
1− q + q exp
[
1
2σ2
(
2x∆S −∆S2)]}αdx
(a)
=
1
α− 1 log
∫
u0
α∑
k=0
(
α
k
)
(1− q)k−αqk exp (N)dx
=
1
α− 1 log
α∑
k=0
(
α
k
)
(1− q)k−αqk exp
[
k∆S2(k − 1)
2σ2
]
(b)
≤ 1
α− 1 log
α∑
k=0
(
α
k
)
(1− q)k−α
[
q exp
(
∆S2α
2σ2
)]
=
α
α− 1 log
{
1 + q
[
exp
(
∆S2α
2σ2
)
− 1
]}
(c)
≤ α
α− 1q
[
exp
(
∆S2α
2σ2
)
− 1
]
(d)
≤ α
α− 1q
[
∆S2α
2σ2
+O
(
∆S4α2
4σ4
)]
≤ qα
2∆S2
2(α− 1)σ2 ,
(26)
where step (a) uses the binomial expansion, N is denoted by
k
2σ2
(
2x∆S −∆S2), and step (b) is obtained by k − 1 ≤ α.
Step (c) uses Taylor series expansion, and step (d) is obtained
by Taylor series expansion.
We then calculate Dα
(
Ld(X′)
Ld(X)
)
as
Dα
(
Ld (X
′)
Ld (X)
)
=
1
α−1 logEx∼Ld(X)
[
Ld(X
′)
Ld(X)
]
=
1
α− 1 log
∫
u0
[
u0
(1− q)u0 + qu1
]α−1
dx
=
1
α− 1 log
∫
u0
[
(1− q)u0 + qu1
u0
]1−α
dx
=
1
α− 1 log
∫
u0
{
1− q + q exp
[
1
2σ2
(
2x∆S −∆S2)]}1−αdx
(a)
=
1
α− 1 log
∫
u0
{ ∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
α+ k − 2
k
)
qkH
}
dx
(b)
≤ 1
α− 1 log
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
α+ k − 2
k
)
qk exp (N)(1− q)1−k−α
=
1
α− 1 log
[
1− q + q exp
(
∆S2α
2σ2
)]1−α
= − log
{
1 + q
[
exp
(
∆S2α
2σ2
)
−1
]}
< Dα
(
Ld(X)
Ld(X ′)
)
,
(27)
where step (a) is obtained by (x+ a)−n =
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
n+ k − 1
k
)
xka−n−k, and H is denoted by
exp
[
k
2σ2
(
2x∆S −∆S2)] (1− q)1−k−α. Step (b) is obtained
by k − 1 ≤ α, and N is denoted by [ k2σ2 (2x∆S −∆S2)].
As a result,  = qα
2∆S2
2(α−1)σ2 which concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
By applying Proposition 2 to their composition, we can
obtain that for all α > 1,
Dα [Fd (X) ||Fd (X ′)] ≤ 2αn2. (28)
Denote Pr [Fd(X) ∈ S] by P and Pr [Fd(X ′) ∈ S] by Q and
consider two cases.
Case I: log 1/Q ≥ 2n. According to the Proposition 3 and
choosing α =
√
log 1/Q/(
√
n) ≥ 1, we have
P ≤ {exp {Dα [Fd (X) ||Fd (X ′)]} ·Q}1−1/α
≤ exp [2 (α− 1)n2] ·Q1−1/α
(a)
< exp
[
2
√
n log 1/Q− 2n2 − (logQ) /α
]
·Q
< exp
(
2
√
n log 1/Q
)
·Q,
(29)
where step (a) is obtained by substituting α =√
log 1/Q/(
√
n) ≥ 1 into the equation.
Case II: log 1/Q < 2n. This case follows trivially, since
the right hand of Eq. (14) is larger than 1 as:
exp
(
2
√
n log 1/Q
)
·Q ≥ exp (2 log 1/Q) ·Q = 1/Q > 1.
(30)
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let X and X ′ be two adjacent inputs, and S be some subset
results of the loss function Fd. To argue (d, δ)-differential
private of Fd, we need to verify that
Pr [Fd(X) ∈ S] ≤ exp (d) Pr [Fd (X ′) ∈ S] + δ. (31)
According to Lemma 1, we know that
Pr [Fd(X) ∈ S] ≤
exp
{
2
√
n log /Pr [Fd(X ′) ∈ S]
}
· Pr [Fd (X ′) ∈ S] .
(32)
Denote Pr [Fd(X) ∈ S] by P and Pr [Fd(X ′) ∈ S] by Q and
we can obtain that
P ≤ exp
(
2
√
n log 1/Q
)
·Q. (33)
Eq. (33) can be divided into two cases as follows.
Case I: 8 log 1/δ > log 1/Q. Then Eq. (33) can be derived
by
P ≤ exp
(
2
√
8n log 1/δ
)
·Q
= exp
(
4
√
2n log 1/δ
)
·Q ≤ exp(d) + δ.
(34)
Case II: 8 log 1/δ ≤ log 1/Q. Then Eq. (33) can be derived
by
P
(a)
≤ exp
(
2
√
log 1/δ · log 1/Q
)
·Q
≤ exp
(√
1/2 log 1/Q
)
·Q
= Q1−1/
√
2 ≤ Q1/8 = δ ≤ δ + exp(d),
(35)
where step (a) is obtained by substituting the condition
8 log 1/δ ≤ log 1/Q into the equation.
This concludes the proof.
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